The European Convention on Human Rights and the Hungarian Legal System by Bárd, Petra & Bárd, Károly
Petra Bard – Károly Bárd   147
The European Convention
on Human Rights and
the Hungarian Legal System
Dr. Bárd Petra LL.M. PhD
Eötvös Lóránd University, Faculty of Law, Associate Professor
Prof. Dr. Károly Bárd PhD
Central European University, Legal Studies Department, 
Head of Department, Professor
I. The status of the ECHR at the national level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  148
I.1. Historical aspects of accession to the ECHR . . . . . . . . . . . .  148
I.2. Beyond dualism: the relationship between the ECHR
and the national legal order  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  149
II. Domestic courts’ referral to the ECHR and the Strasbourg
case-law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  151
II.1. Disregard of the ECtHR case-law: clear violation
of national law  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  152
II.2. Cherry-picking from the case-law and abusive
references to the Strasbourg jurisprudence. . . . . . . . . . . .  158
II.3. References to the ECHR and the related case-law by
domestic courts: good practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  159
III. Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  164
Comparative Study    148
I. The status of the ECHR at the national level
I.1. Historical aspects of accession to the ECHR
H ungary was the first “post-communist” country to join the Council of Europe and signed the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: ECHR 
or Convention) on 6 November 1990. The ECHR and its eight Protocols 
were ratified back in 1992.1
Before ratification it was decided to thoroughly scrutinize Hungarian 
legislation on its compatibility with Strasbourg case law and to first 
prepare legislation in areas where compliance with the jurisprudence 
of the Convention organs called for modifications. Thus an Inter-
Ministerial Committee was set up chaired by the then Ministry of 
Justice deputy secretary of state and composed of senior civil servants 
working in the various ministries. After seventeen months of study and 
analysis the report was submitted to the government. The conclusions 
were published in a Hungarian human rights journal and were made 
available to all Members of Parliament.2 The Committee identified 
relatively few areas where the Convention required modification of 
Hungarian laws. This was partly explained by the fact that by the 1989 
amendment of the 1949 Constitution the chapter on human rights was 
radically modified. Further, Parliament enacted in the years of 1989 
and 1990 numerous acts relating to basic rights, such as the right to 
strike, freedom of assembly, and freedom of conscience. In addition, 
amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code 
also contributed to narrowing the gap between Hungarian law and the 
Convention.
1 The ECHR and its eight Protocols were ratified on 5 November 1992 and 
incorporated into the Hungarian legal system through Act XXXI of 1993 on 
7 April 1993 entering into force eight days later. The Act provides that the 
Convention and Protocols 1, 2 and 4 have to be applied as of 5 November 1992, 
Protocol 6 is applicable as of 1 December 1992, and Protocol 7 applied from 1 
February 1993.
2 For a detailed summary of the findings see Doc. H(95)2 of the Council of Europe 
published also in A. Drzemczewski, ‘Ensuring Compatibility of Domestic Law 
with the European Convention on Human Rights Prior to Ratification: The 
Hungarian Model. Introduction to a Reference Document,’ Human Rights Law 
Journal, 16 (7–9) (1995), 241–60.
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Hungary ratified all but two protocols to the Convention:3 Protocol 12, 
which was signed, but not ratified,4 and Protocol No. 14bis.5
I.2. Beyond dualism: the relationship between the ECHR
 and the national legal order
On 18 April 2011 a new constitution was passed by Parliament by the 
two-third majority of MPs, signed by the President on 25 April 2011. The 
document entitled Fiundamental Law (hereinafter: FL) entered into force 
on 1 January 2012. Hungary’s FL defines the relation between international 
and domestic law in the same way as the former Constitution. The FL 
first stipulates that “Hungary shall ensure the conformity between 
international law and Hungarian law in order to fulfill its obligation under 
international law” [Article Q (2)]. Further, the FL proclaims that “Hungary 
shall accept the generally recognized rules of international law” and that 
“other sources of international law shall become part of the Hungarian 
legal system by promulgation” [Article Q (3)].
Generally recognized rules of international law become automatically 
part of the Hungarian legal order (and in the Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation are above domestic laws), while international treaties 
must be proclaimed in a domestic law.6 Thus the FL like the previous 
Constitution opted for the dualist approach: international treaties must 
be transformed in the form of an Act of Parliament or a decree to be 
part of the Hungarian legal system and by this to become directly 
enforceable.7 Because rules on fundamental rights and obligations 
3 Protocol 11 to the ECHR restructuring the control machinery established 
thereby has been signed on 11 May 1994, ratified on 26 April 1995 and is 
applicable to Hungary from 1 November 1998. The law that implemented the 
Protocol is Act XLII of 1998. Protocol 13 concerning the abolition of the death 
penalty in all circumstances was signed on 3 May 2002, and entered into force 
on 1 November 2003. The corresponding Hungarian law is Act III of 2004. 
Protocol No. 14 amending the control system of the Convention was signed on 
7 April 2005 and ratified on 21 December 2005. The implementing Hungarian 
law is Act CXXIV of 2005.
4 Protocol 12 was signed on 4 November 2000 but is not yet ratified.
5 Protocol 14bis was signed on 11 November 2009 but not yet ratified. See 
Decrees of the Prime Minister Nos. 20/2009. (V. 12.) and 32/2009. (VI.18.). Since 
Russia signed Protocol No. 14 in January 2010 as the last high contracting party, 
Protocol No. 14bis lost its relevance.
6 Constitutional Court Decision No. 53/1993. (X. 13.).
7 The ‘generally recognized rules’ are transformed directly by the Constitution 
(and similarly by the FL). Constitutional Court Decision No. 53/1993. (X. 13.).
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may be laid down exclusively in an Act of Parliament, international 
human rights treaties must also be promulgated in an Act enacted by 
Parliament.
From all this it may appear that the Convention promulgated by an 
Act of Parliament has the same rank as any other act and in case 
of conflict the lex posterior prevails. However, in the Constitutional 
Court’s (hereinafter: CC) interpretation the act transforming an 
international treaty is superior to other acts and in the case of conflict 
the latter have to be annulled.8 It should be noted that the fourth 
amendment to the FL9 repealed the rulings of the CC given prior to 
the entry into force of the FL.10 This was interpreted to mean that 
the Court is no longer bound by its earlier rulings and may not even 
make reference to them. However, the CC made it clear that it still may 
make reference to arguments used in earlier decisions provided that 
it gives a detailed reasoning why it does so. However, the CC added 
that due to the fourth amendment to the FL it may disregard legal 
principles elaborated in earlier decisions even if the text of the given 
provision in the FL and the previous Constitution is identical.11 In 
principle the CC would therefore be free to reconsider its position on 
the supremacy of acts promulgating international treaties over other 
Acts of Parliament in the future. Nevertheless in a fear of rule of law 
backsliding, and in search of standards on which the government 
had no influence12 in Decision 61/2011. (VII. 13.) the CC made clear 
that domestic constitutional protection of human rights must not go 
8 Constitutional Court Decision No. 15/2004. (V. 14.), Decision No. 2/1994. (I. 
14.), and Decision No. 99/2008. (VII. 3). For details see P. Bárd, ‘Hungary,’ in L. 
Hammer and F. Emmert (eds.), The European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe (The Hague: Eleven 
Publishing, 2012), 225–6.
9 Adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on 11 March 2013.
10 Article 19 of the fourth amendment to the FL, incorporated as point 5 in the 
Closing and Miscellaneous Provisions of the Fundamental Law. This provision 
might have been the legislator’s response to the Constitutional Court Decision 
No. 22/2012. (V. 11.), which explicitly declared that the Court in subsequent 
cases may use the arguments appearing in its decisions rendered prior to the 
entry into force of the FL provided that the content of the provision in the FL 
is identical or similar to that of the previous Constitution and if the rules of 
interpretation of the FL permit the use of the arguments.
11 Constitutional Court Decision No. 13/2013. (VI. 17.), para. 30–1.
12 Viktor Kazai, „... hogy ne kelljen a múltat ”végképp eltörölni“” [Interview with 
Constitutional Court Justice Miklós Lévay], Fundmentum 2016/1, 59–71., 64.
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below international level of protection and that the CC must follow 
the ECtHR case-law.13
However, the fact is that both the FL and the law on the CC14 provide 
for the review of domestic laws on their compliance with international 
treaties and not the other way round. According to Article 24 (2) f) of 
the FL, the CC shall examine whether rules of law are in conflict with 
an international treaty. Article 24 (3) stipulates that the CC may “annul 
the law or its provision conflicting with an international treaty”. Article 
32 (1) of the law on the CC provides that “(P)ursuant to Article 24 (2) 
f) of the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court shall examine 
legal regulations on request or ex officio in the course of any of its 
proceedings”. In addition to listing those entitled to request such 
a review15 paragraph (2) of the same article provides that “judges 
shall suspend judicial proceedings and initiate Constitutional Court 
proceedings if, in the course of the adjudication of a concrete case, they 
are bound to apply a legal regulation that they perceive to be contrary 
to an international treaty.”16
II. Domestic courts’ referral to the ECHR
 and the Strasbourg case-law
Some of the judges of the Curia are appointed by the president of 
the Curia as advisors on European law to assist – in collaboration 
with the Office for International Relations and European Law – their 
colleagues at all levels of the court system in the interpretation of 
13 Constitutional Court Decision No. Decision 61/2011. (VII. 13.), Parts 2.2. and 3.
14 Act No. CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court.
15 One-quarter of Members of Parliament, the Government, the President of the 
Curia, the Prosecutor General, and the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights.
16 Judges’ authorization to initiate proceedings before the Constitutional 
Court constitutes a laudable development. Under the former law on the 
Constitutional Court (Act No. XXXII of 1989) this could only be done by the 
president of the Supreme Court and the Chief Public Prosecutor. The Inter-
Ministerial Committee preparing the ratification in its report in 1992 suggested 
that each court should be given the right to suspend the proceedings and 
invoke the Constitutional Court in case of a perceived conflict between 
domestic legislation and the Convention. See Drzemczewski, ‘Ensuring 
Compatibility of Domestic Law with the European Convention on Human 
Rights Prior to Ratification’, 250.
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the ECtHR judgments.17 This is all the more important because – in 
principle – Hungarian judges are under the obligation to directly 
apply the Convention and the Strasbourg judgments. According to Act 
No. L of 2005. on the procedure concerning international treaties “in 
interpreting an international treaty the decisions of the body entrusted 
with the authority to settle disputes arising out of the treaty must also 
be considered” [Article 13(1)]. This provision was meant to put an end 
to the debate on the extent to which Strasbourg jurisprudence has 
to be followed in domestic proceedings.18 Prior to the entering into 
force of the Law on international treaties only the CC’s duty to observe 
Strasbourg jurisprudence was obvious due to the constitutional 
provision that Hungary shall ensure the conformity between 
international and Hungarian law in order to fulfil its obligation under 
international law [Article Q (2)]. This debate was supposed to come to 
an end, but seemingly the 2005 Act did not resolve all debates.
II.1. Disregard of the ECtHR case-law: clear violation
 of national law
Although the Supreme Court in its judgments dating back to 2003 and 
2004 stated that all Hungarian courts have to follow the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR, this position was not shared by all judges: some insisted 
on applying exclusively domestic laws and opined that the ECtHR 
judgments were not binding for Hungarian courts.19 Unfortunately, 
even after the entering into force of Act L of 2005 on the procedure 
concerning international treaties, there have been cases in which courts 
consciously disregarded judgments of the ECtHR arguing that those are 
binding on the government as party to the Strasbourg proceedings 
only. As the Metropolitan Court of Appeal argued in a case: although 
the ECtHR “judgments – as a result of legal harmonization – shape 
Hungarian law, Hungarian courts are not obliged or authorized to apply 
them directly”.20
17 Article 23(2) of Instruction 9/2012 of the President of the Curia on the 
Organizational and Operational Regulation of the Curia. Available at http://
www.kuria-birosag.hu/hu/kuria-alkotmanyos-helye-feladatai-es-hataskore
18 E. Polgári, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Case-Law 
of the European Court of Human Rights in Hungarian Judicial Practice’, 
Fundamentum, 5 (2008), 74.
19 Ibid., 74–5, 80.
20 Judgment No. Pfv.V.20.607/2007/9. Cited in ibid., 75.
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Case Vajnai v. Hungary of 8 July 2008, Application number 33629/06 
involved Attila Vajnai, then vice-president of the Workers’ Party, a 
Hungarian left-wing political party, who was convicted for wearing a 
five-pointed red star, the symbol of the international workers’ movement 
banned by Article 269/B of the Hungarian Criminal Code then in force 
(Act No. IV of 1978) at a demonstration on the streets of Budapest. 
The Court underlined that there was no real and present danger of 
any political movement or party restoring Communist dictatorship. 
As to the red star as a political symbol of totalitarian ideology, the 
ECtHR noted that the potential propagation of that ideology, however 
repellent, cannot be the sole reason for criminalization of the use of 
totalitarian insignia. The red star is a symbol to which several meanings 
may be attached and in the present case it was used by a leader of a 
registered political party without any known totalitarian ambitions. 
His use of the totalitarian symbol cannot be equated with dangerous 
propaganda in the Court’s view. On the contrary, Article 269/B of the 
Hungarian Criminal Code then in force did not require proof that the 
actual display amounted to totalitarian propaganda, but limited the use 
of the red star in an unreasonably broad and indiscriminate way: the 
use of the red star was prohibited unless it served a scientific, artistic, 
informational or educational purpose. Therefore, the Court found 
Hungary to be in violation of Article 10 ECHR. Not just the legislative 
power, but also judiciary could have remedied the problems of the 
respective Criminal Code provision by applying the test developed by 
the ECtHR whenever adjudicating cases of displaying the insignia of 
totalitarian regimes. Nevertheless, it failed to do so, and continued to 
hold suspects responsible for wearing the red star, irrespectively of the 
social and individual contexts. In the Fratanoló case,21 which resulted 
in finding Hungary again in breach of the Convention for convicting 
applicant for using the red star in public, the Pécs Court of Appeal 
argued that it may not apply the test developed by the ECtHR in the 
Vajnai judgment. In the court’s opinion it has to apply the provision 
of the Hungarian Criminal Code according to which the offense is 
completed by the mere public display of symbols of totalitarian 
regimes. Therefore the court is prevented from extending the inquiry 
to further facts as indicated in the Vajnai judgment.22 The second part 
21 Fratanoló v. Hungary, No. 29459/10, 3 November 2011.
22 According to the Vajnai judgment the criminal conviction for using the red star 
is in line with the Convention if it can be proven that there was a real danger 
of restoring Communism and that the defendant identified herself or himself 
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of the red star saga in front of the CC is an example of good practice, 
please see Chapter II.3.
In the more recent case Magyar v Hungary, the Hungarian system of 
life imprisonment without parole was challenged and held to be in 
violation of the Convention.23 In a series of relevant judgments the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court proved that 
they were neither capable of enforcing European standards, nor of 
complying with European review mechanisms,24 and the latter also 
instructed ordinary courts not to directly consider the Convention, but 
apply domestic law instead, even if in clear contradiction of Strasbourg 
tests. In Magyar v. Hungary the ECtHR issued its long awaited judgment 
on the Hungarian life imprisonment regime, and held that the sanction 
of life imprisonment as regulated by the respondent state, which is de 
jure and de facto irreducible, amounts to a violation of the prohibition 
of degrading and inhuman punishment as regulated by Article 3 ECHR. 
The outcome was rather predictable in light of previous Strasbourg 
case-law, in particular the Grand Chamber decision in Vinter v. the UK.25 
The judgment was challenged by the Hungarian government, but the 
request to the Grand Chamber referral was rejected. The judgment 
became final in October 2014. First the ECtHR distinguished the case 
from earlier case-law, in particular from Törköly v Hungary,26 where the 
Applicant was not excluded from conditional release since the domestic 
court imposed a life sentence on him, with eligibility for release on 
parole after 40 years. There the Court applied a lower scrutiny to the 
institution to presidential pardon. In the Magyar case however, the 
Applicant was excluded from conditional release, therefore a stricter 
review applies to his case. The stricter test made the Court come to 
the following conclusion: since domestic Hungarian legislation did 
with the meaning of the sign representing a totalitarian regime. For a critical 
assessment of the position of the Pécs Court of Appeal, Pfv.V.20.607/2007/9. 
Bárd, ‘The non-enforcement of Strasbourg decisions and its consequences’.
23 ECtHR, Magyar v Hungary, No. 73593/10, 20 May 2014.
24 For the saga see P. Bárd, The Hungarian life imprisonment regime in front of 
apex courts I. – The findings of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Constitutional Court, 18 June 2015, http://jog.tk.mta.hu/blog/2015/06/the-
hungarian-life-imprisonment-hu and P. Bárd, The Hungarian life imprisonment 
regime in front of apex courts II. – The findings of the Kúria (Supreme Court), 18 
June 2015, http://jog.tk.mta.hu/blog/2015/06/the-hungarian-life-imp-hu.
25 ECtHR, Vinter v. the UK, Nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 2013.
26 ECtHR, Törköly v Hungary, No. 4413/06, 5 April 2011.
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not oblige the authorities or the President of the Republic to assess, 
whenever a prisoner requested a pardon, whether his or her continued 
imprisonment was justified on legitimate penological grounds, and 
since they were not bound to give reasons for the decisions concerning 
such requests, the ECtHR considered that the institution of presidential 
pardon, taken alone did not allow prisoners to know what they had to 
do to be considered for release and under what conditions, and did not 
guarantee proper consideration of the changes and progress towards 
rehabilitation made by the prisoner. The discretionary nature of the 
presidential pardon led the Court to believe that the life imprisonment 
of Mr. Magyar was in fact irreducible in breach of Article 3 of the 
Convention. The Court also noted that the human rights violation 
was caused by a systemic problem, which may give rise to similar 
applications, and therefore suggested a legislative reform of the system 
of review of whole life sentences.
The Hungarian legislative responded to the judgment by a modification 
of the Penitentiary Code.27 According to the new review mechanism 
prisoners sentenced to real life imprisonment have the right to have 
the possibility of conditional release examined, after having served 40 
years in prison. The end of a complex review mechanism is a judicial 
body’s, the Pardon Committee’s reasoned opinion, which might or 
might not be taken into account by the President who retains the final 
and discretionary say on pardon. The new law still kept the problematic 
parts of the earlier regulation: the President of the Republic deciding 
on pardon is not bound by the opinion of the Pardon Committee, and 
is not obliged to give a reasoned opinion, therefore aspects decisive to 
have a realistic chance of conditional release can still not be foreseen 
at the time of imposing the life sanction. At the same time, the new 
process was likely to fail on the ground that pardon may take place 
after 40.28
The Hungarian Constitutional Court (hereinafter: HCC) had a chance to 
remedy the situation and could have prevented yet another attack on 
the life imprisonment regime in front of the ECtHR. However the HCC 
27 See Article 109 of Act LXXII of 2014, which inserted a new subtitle on the 
mandatory pardon proceeding of persons sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of conditional release, Articles 46/A-46/H into Act CCXL 
of 2013.
28 As foreseen by P. Bárd, op. cit.
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missed this opportunity in HCC Resolution 3013/2015. (I. 27.). In a rather 
dubious decision the majority of the court rejected the complaint and 
did not decide the case in the merits. The majority noted that the rules 
on life imprisonment changed since the constitutional challenge was 
submitted. The majority held that the new rules introduced by the 
Penitentiary Code on the Pardon Committee procedure were new 
circumstances that made the case substantially obsolete, and therefore 
the procedure was terminated. The majority decision was harshly 
criticized for a lack of causal relation between the change of the law and 
a constitutional review becoming obsolete.29 These voices stated the 
obvious: the mere fact that a law was amended does not automatically 
render the modification constitutional.
As a means of individual measure of enforcement in its decision of 
11 June 2015 the Kúria, the Supreme Court of Hungary had to decide 
on Mr. Magyar’s case again in the review procedure. The judgment 
was rendered in the middle of political pressures not to destroy the 
constitutionally entrenched30 institution of life imprisonment without 
parole.31 Two issues needed to be decided by the Kúria in light of 
the Strasbourg Magyar judgment: the procedural form reviewing 
the possibility and the earliest date of conditional release. The Kúria 
acknowledged that the Hungarian law’s Pardon Committee review 
mechanism contravened the Convention as interpreted by the ECtHR 
due to its discretionary nature. Therefore the Kúria disregarded the 
new piece of law, sentenced Mr. Magyar to life, with conditional release 
possible after 40 years the earliest. By refusing the Pardon Committee 
29 Eötvös Károly Institute, Immár “nyilvánvalóan okafogyott” az 
Alkotmánybírósághoz fordulni [It became clearly obsolate to turn to the 
Constitutional Court], http://www.ekint.org/ekint/ekint.news.page?nodeid=769.
30 The possibility of real life imprisonment was constitutionally embedded 
into Article IV Section (2) of the Fundamental Law, which holds that real life 
imprisonment may only be imposed for the commission of intentional and 
violent criminal offences. One should read this provision in conjunction of 
Article Q Section (2) of the Fundamental Law on Hungary’s obligation to 
ensure that Hungarian law was in conformity with international law.
31 Nem fogjuk hagyni a tényleges életfogytiglan eltörlését [We will not let the 
abolition of the real life imprisonment regime], 28 May 2015, http://www.
fidesz.hu/hirek/2015-05-28/nem-fogjuk-hagyni-a-tenyleges-eletfogytiglan-
eltorleset/; Szükség van a tényleges életfogytiglanra a többszörösen visszaeső 
bűnözőkkel szemben [Real life imprisonment is needed for recidivists], 10 
June 2015, http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2015-06-10/szukseg-van-a-tenyleges-
eletfogytiglanra-a-tobbszorosen-visszaeso-bunozokkel-szemben/
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proceeding and placing the decision on a potential future conditional 
release of Mr. Magyar into the hands of the judiciary, the Kúria created 
a Törköly-like scenario, and therefore the Hungarian justices believed 
that their judgment could not be successfully attacked in front of the 
ECtHR. The Kúria dismissed the possibility of taking the ECtHR cases 
other than those decided against Hungary into account. With this 
problematic stance, it excluded the Vinter case from its review, and 
as a consequence refused to go into the merits of the 40-year-rule. A 
week later a resolution concerning the uniformity of criminal law was 
issued by another Section of the Kúria,32 making clear that the Magyar 
case must not set precendent, and that it should have been decided 
taking the new pardon committee procedure into account. The Kúria 
also took the stance that in case a criminal procedure is reopened 
as an individual measure of enforcement, the court shall not directly 
rely on the Convention, but shall apply domestic law not effected by 
the Strasbourg judgment. The Kúria also stated that Hungarian courts 
must not assess Hungarian laws in light of the Convention. It insisted 
that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is allowed 
by international law, and that the ECtHR case law, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court’s decision or the above mentioned Magyar 
decision do not offer reasons to depart from the newly established 
pardon procedure. This statement is difficult to interpret, since the 
Constitutional Court did not decide on the new procedure in the merits, 
whereas the Strasbourg jurisprudence is in clear contradiction with the 
new rules.
As a consequece of the Hungarian disrespect for Strasbourg decisions, 
the ECtHR refined its position in a judgment where it found Hungary’s 
new legislation on whole life sentences again to be in violation of 
Article 3 of the Convention. In T. P and A. T. v. Hungary33 the Court found 
the 40-year-rule for reviewing the possibility of conditional release 
as too long and a violation of its earlier case-law, namely Vinter v. the 
UK.34 The ECtHR not only made clear that the new law is in violation of 
the Convention, but it indirectly condemned the Kúria for not taking 
its case-law into consideration, other than cases where Hungary was a 
Respondent, in the review procedure. At the same time there was a lack 
of sufficient safeguards in the remainder of the procedure foreseen by 
32 Resolution No. 3/2015 concerning the uniformity of criminal law.
33 T. P and A. T. v. Hungary, Nos.: 37871/14 and 73986/14, 4 October 2016.
34 ECtHR, Vinter v. the UK, Nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 2013.
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the new Hungarian legislation. The ECtHR was therefore not persuaded 
that, the applicants’ life sentences provided them with the prospect 
of release or a possibility of review. The judgment is not yet binding. 
The Hungarian Ministry of Justice thinks the Strasbourg judgment is ill-
founded and considers appealing to the Grand Chamber.35
II.2. Cherry-picking from the case-law and abusive references
 to the Strasbourg jurisprudence
Fortunately more and more courts in Hungary invoke Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in different type of cases, such as custody of children, 
pretrial detention, judges’ disqualification for lack of impartiality, or in 
personality rights lawsuits.36 It must also be noted that when reading 
the references to Strasbourg jurisprudence in some of the decisions 
of higher courts and of the CC one may gain the impression that the 
ECtHR case law is invoked rather to give additional legitimacy to the 
conclusion the courts have already arrived at under Hungarian law.37
From time to time in order to justify the desired outcome courts 
invoke Strasbourg jurisprudence when this is clearly inappropriate, or 
arbitrarily select certain passages of the ECtHR decisions that are in 
contrast with the spirit of the judgment at hand.
The CC, for instance, in the decision finding the provision of the 
Criminal Code that penalizes the violation of national symbols to 
be compatible with the Constitution,38 invoked the Otto-Preminger 
Institute39 and Wingrove40 judgments. It rightly noted that in those 
cases the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression was 
found to be justified for the protection of others’ right to respect for 
religious feelings but drew the arbitrary conclusion that the conviction 
35 See the government’s website at http://www.kormany.hu/hu/
igazsagugyi-miniszterium/hirek/aggalyos-a-tenyleges-eletfogytig-tarto-
szabadsagvesztessel-kapcsolatos-itelet, 4 October 2016
36 For references to the ECtHR case law see E. Polgári, ‘The European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Hungarian Judicial Practice’ Fundamentum, 5(2008), 74–80.
37 Viktor Kazai, op. cit.
38 Constitutional Court Decision No. 13/2000. (V. 12.).
39 Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria, No. 13470/87, 20 September 1994, Series 
A295-A.
40 Wingrove v. United Kingdom, No. 17419/90, 25 November, the ECHR 1996-V.
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and feeling of belonging to a given state should be afforded similar 
protection. The CC disregarded the fact that the ECtHR found the 
interference acceptable through reading Articles 9 and 10 of the 
Convention together, while the “feeling of belonging to a certain state” 
may not be brought under any right listed in the ECHR.41
The decision of the Metropolitan Court on the prolongation of the 
pretrial detention in the case underlying the Hagyó judgment of the 
ECtHR42 involving an opposition politician, is a striking example of the 
abusive reference to Strasbourg jurisprudence, taken out of context in 
order to justify conclusions that are opposite to what the ECtHR has 
ruled.43 According to the decision “there is extremely pressing public 
interest in fully and accurately exploring the criminal conduct that 
caused loss of state property of a magnitude unprecedented in the 
history of the Republic of Hungary and in convicting all members of the 
criminal organization suspected of having committed the crimes. The 
unimpeded conduct of the investigation requires that the suspects are 
completely deprived of their personal liberty. The authorities’ activity 
aiming at proving the suspects’ guilt must be given preference over 
the rights of the suspects. The suspects’ right to liberty is outweighed 
by the public interest in prolonging the pre-trial detention”. The 
Metropolitan Court noted without indicating one single judgment that 
this was the position of the ECtHR.44
II.3. References to the ECHR and the related case-law
 by domestic courts: good practices
Undoubtedly, the Strasbourg jurisprudence has had an impact on 
enhancing the democratic process and political pluralism. The first set of 
relevant cases concerns the freedom of assembly. In Bukta and others v. 
Hungary45 the Court found that the dispersal of a spontaneous peaceful 
41 Judge Németh in his concurring opinion noted that the reference to the ECtHR 
judgments and the conclusion drawn was incorrect.
42 Hagyó v. Hungary, No. 52624/10, 23 April 2013. The Court found Hungary in 
violation of Articles 3, 5(3), 5(4), 8, and Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8.
43 Case No. 30. Bnf. 1355/2010.
44 Metropolitan Court, Bnf. 1355/2010/2., 26 May 2010. The full text of the decision 
is available at http://hagyomiklos.com/files/07.pdf. We are grateful to Mr. A. 
Kádár, copresident of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee for drawing attention 
to the decision of the Budapest Court.
45 Bukta and others v. Hungary, No. 25691/04, 17 July 2007.
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assembly because of the demonstrators’ failure to notify the police 
in advance was in breach of Article 11. Following the Bukta judgment 
the CC ruled that freedom of assembly extends also to demonstrations 
held without prior organization and annulled the provision of the law 
on freedom of assembly (Act No. III of 1989) which listed the absence of 
prior notification among the grounds for dispersing demonstrations.46
In Patyi and others v. Hungary47 the ECtHR found that the interference 
with the applicants’ freedom of assembly had been disproportionate. 
The applicants who were among the creditors of an insolvent private 
company were planning to hold silent demonstrations in front of 
the prime minister’s private home. They duly notified the police, 
which refused to grant permission with the explanation that the 
demonstration would hinder traffic. The decision of the police was 
confirmed by the Budapest Regional Court. Although the interference 
pursued the legitimate aims of protecting others’ rights and the 
prevention of disorder the ECtHR found the explanation given by the 
police and the court unconvincing and concluded that the limitation of 
the applicants’ freedom of assembly was not necessary in a democratic 
society.
Second, the preceding judgments of the ECtHR have broadened the 
scope of freedom of expression and contributed significantly to the 
strengthening of political pluralism primarily through rulings of the 
CC. In 1994 the CC found in its decision focusing on freedom of the 
press48 that the criminal offense of insult to an authority or an official 
that carried a heavier penalty than ordinary slander and defamation 
is incompatible with the freedom of expression as guaranteed in the 
Constitution and repealed the relevant provision of the Criminal Code. 
The CC asserted that, with the annulling of the offense, the reputation 
of public figures and those exercising official authority is protected 
under the general provisions of the Criminal Code on slander and 
defamation.
The decision of the CC also implicitly modified the provision on slander 
if committed to the detriment of officials and politicians. According to 
the relevant provision of the Criminal Code the offender was criminally 
46 Constitutional Court Decision No. 75/2008. (V. 29.).
47 Patyi and others v. Hungary, No. 5529/05, 7 October 2008.
48 Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/1994. (VI. 24.).
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liable of an allegation if that could impugn the honor of the injured 
party irrespective of the truthfulness of the allegation. However, the 
court could permit the defendant to prove the truthfulness of the 
allegation if this was justified by public or pressing private interest. If 
permission was granted and the defendant succeeded in proving the 
truthfulness of the slanderous allegation he or she had to be acquitted. 
Accordingly only proven truth precluded criminal liability.49
However, with respect to slanderous allegations made in respect of 
politicians and other public figures, the CC asserted that the person 
making the allegation can be held criminally liable only if he or she 
knew that the statement was in essence untrue, or was only unaware 
of its untruthfulness because he or she failed to display the necessary 
care and circumspection incumbent upon him or her according to 
the relevant rules of his or her vocation or profession. Thus, contrary 
to the text of the Criminal Code, the CC recognized impunity also for 
false allegations provided that the injured party was a public figure and 
the defendant could not be blamed for negligence with regards to the 
error in fact.
The CC relied heavily on the case law of the ECtHR. It summarized and 
employed the principles developed by the Court on the scope and the 
limits of criticism infringing the honor of politicians and public officials 
in the leading cases such as Lingens v. Austria,50 Castells v. Spain,51 or 
Thorgeirson v. Iceland.52
In 2004 the CC – through the adoption of a constitutional requirement – 
extended the immunity of Members of Parliament on their expressions 
containing a value judgment made against fellow Members of 
Parliament s, politicians acting in public, or persons exercising public 
power in the context of debates pertaining to public affairs.53 The 
CC reviewed the rules on the immunity of Members of Parliament in 
constitutional democracies and with reference to numerous judgments 
it summarized the Strasbourg case law on politicians’ freedom of 
speech. The CC stressed the importance of free debate of public 
49 Act No. IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code, Article 232.
50 Lingens v. Austria, No. 9815/82, 8 July 1986, Series A103.
51 Castells v. Spain, No. 11798/85, 23 April 1992, Series A236.
52 T. Thorgeirson v. Iceland, No. 13778/88, 25 June 1992, Series A239.
53 Constitutional Court Decision No. 34/2004. (IX. 28.).
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affairs in Parliament and concluded that in the case of allegations that 
could impugn the honor of a politician the immunity of a Member 
of Parliament can be suspended only if he or she knew that the 
statement was, in essence, untrue. By this the CC further broadened 
impunity from prosecution for slander: Members of Parliament may 
not be held criminally liable for false allegations even if the error can 
be attributed to their failure to display the necessary care provided 
that the allegation concerns public affairs and is made against other 
politicians or persons exercising public power. In sum, the ECtHR case 
law through the decisions of the CC has had considerable impact on 
raising awareness of the crucial place of uninhibited political speech 
in a democratic society. This is true, even if some recent legislative 
measures raise concerns, and it may not be ruled out with certainty 
that the achieved standard in guaranteeing freedom of political speech 
will be lowered. As noted earlier, the Venice commission had criticized 
the provision of the fourth amendment of the FL,54 which prohibits the 
exercise of the right to freedom of speech “with the aim of violating the 
dignity of the Hungarian nation”. The Venice commission rightly fears 
that this provision could easily be abused for curtailing the criticism of 
the Hungarian institutions and office holders. The new Criminal Code 
penalizes the violation of not only the national anthem, the flag, or 
the coat of arms of Hungary as did the previous Criminal Code, but 
also violation of the Holy Crown [Article 334 of Act No. C of 2012]. 
The fourth amendment to the FL brought about a rather problematic 
change to political advertisement during election campaigns: parties 
and candidates may only publish political content through the public 
media, which as research and perception shows stands close and is 
loyal to the governing coalition [Article IX (3)].
We shall come back to the follow-up of the judgments Vajnai v. Hungary 
and Fratanoló v Hungary on the wearing of a five-pointed red star 
discussed supra. Following the ECtHR judgment in Attila Vajnai’s case, 
the applicant was acquitted by the Supreme Court in March 2009, but 
because the law was not changed he was tried and made responsible 
for the wearing the red star act again.55 As a result of the constitutional 
54 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), 
Opinion No. 720/2013, CDL-AD(2013)012, Strasbourg, 17 June 2013 (Opinion).
55 In the meanwhile a new Criminal Code, Act C of 2012 has been adopted and 
the provision on the display of insignia of totalitarian regimes was taken over 
without changes. (Article 335 of the Hungarian Criminal Code)
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complaint by Mr. Vajnai, the CC reviewed the provision on the display 
of insignia of totalitarian regimes after 13 years again in its decision 
4/2013 (II. 21.). The Act on the Constitutional Court allows for a second 
review if circumstances significantly changed in the meanwhile,56 and 
a Strasbourg judgment amounts to such a significant change. With 
regard to the ECtHR case-law, the CC invalidated the respective Criminal 
Code provision as of 30 April 2013. As a result Parliament reinserted a 
modified version of the provision into the Criminal Code, and according 
to new Article 335 the commission of the act needs to be capable of 
disturbing public peace – in particular in a way of violating the human 
dignity or piety of victims of dictatorial regimes – in order for it to 
qualify as a crime.
A number of provisions of Act XIX of 1998 on the Criminal Procedure 
as amended in 2002, 2003 and 2006 are supposed to ensure a 
speedy proceeding. According to Article 176, the investigation has to 
commence within the shortest possible period and has to be concluded 
within two months following its order or start. The prosecutor can 
extend this deadline by two months, in a complex case. After the lapse 
of that deadline, only the County Prosecutor General may postpone 
the deadline up to one year from the commencement of the criminal 
proceedings. After one year, the deadline of the investigation may 
be extended by the Prosecutor General. Should the investigation be 
conducted against a specific person, the extension may not be longer 
than two years.
According to Article 179 detained suspects have to be interrogated 
within twenty-four hours. In line with Article 216 after the inspection 
of the documents of the investigation, within thirty days after receiving 
the documents, the prosecutor has to examine the files of the case and 
take an action (perform further investigation, suspend or terminate the 
investigation, or file an indictment). In exceptional cases, this deadline 
may be extended by the head of the prosecutor’s office by thirty days.
In complicated cases, at the recommendation of the head of the 
prosecutor’s office, the superior prosecutor may exceptionally permit a 
longer – but maximum ninety-day – deadline.
According to Article 287 on the continuity of the trial, the court shall 
not interrupt an already commenced trial, unless required due to the 
56 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, Article 31.
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scope of the case or for other reasons. In these exceptional cases, 
the presiding judge may interrupt the already commenced trial for 
a maximum eight days, and the court may adjourn the trial. Within 
six months, the trial may be resumed without repetition, unless the 
composition of the panel has changed; otherwise the trial has to be 
recommenced anew. As to the appeal at second and third instance, 
Articles 358 and 391 provide that the chairperson of the panel of the 
court sets the trial date within 60 days from the date when she or he 
received the document.
Decision 155/2005. (X.4.) of the National Council of Justice as amended 
through Decision 78/2007. (VI.5.) obliges the courts to annually inform 
the National Council of Justice of cases processed for more than five 
years. The National Council of Justice also asked the Supreme Court, and 
Appellate Courts to discuss the ECHR cases in professional workshops. 
Furthermore, the Hungarian Judicial Academy is to incorporate in its 
courses Article 6(1) case law of the ECtHR.
III. Conclusions
In 2012 Gábor Kardos, professor of international human rights law, 
recalled the concerns voiced by Western European experts more 
than twenty years ago when the accession of the former Communist 
countries of Eastern Europe had been put on the agenda. He also 
made an attempt to assess taking Hungary as the example whether 
the concerns have proven to be valid or not.57 As Kardos observes, 
it was feared that the accession of the transition countries would 
lower the level of protection reached by the early 1990s resulting 
in the alienation of the old state parties from their own human 
rights protection system. It was also anticipated that as a result of 
the applications from the new Member States the ECtHR would be 
confronted with problems of basically political nature such as the 
protection of minorities, compensation for property nationalized 
after World War II, or difficulties arising from prosecution of crimes 
committed under the Communist regime. This – in the skeptics’ view 
57 G. Kardos, ‘Az Emberi Jogok Európai Bírósága és Magyarország: Jogi kultúra 
és hatékonyság’ [The European Court of Human Rights and Hungary: Legal 
Culture and Efficiency], Kriminlógiai Közelmények (Magyar Krtiminológiai 
Társaság, 2012), 205–7.
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– would have hindered the ECtHR in further refining its jurisprudence 
on human rights problems arising in the context of established 
democracies of Western Europe. As regards the Hungarian experience 
Kardos concludes that the fears and concerns have proven to be 
unfounded. The Court was successful in avoiding the use of a ‘double 
standard’ and the judgments rendered in respect of Hungary have not 
lowered the level of protection. The Court, of course, was confronted 
with cases that had their source in the Communist past. In Rekvényi58 
the Court accepted the restriction imposed on police persons’ political 
activities taking into account – among others – the difficulties new 
democracies were faced with in the period of transition. However, 
the Court in Vajnai and Fratanoló made it clear that the historical 
experience of a nation that it was prepared to consider right after the 
collapse of the Communist regime when assessing the necessity of 
the interference may no longer be invoked with the passing of time 
when the country had become a stable democracy.
The ECtHR has contributed to strengthening democracy in Hungary 
through, among others, judgments concerning the right to vote, 
freedom of expression, and access to information. Its jurisprudence 
has become part of Hungarian legal culture. Strasbourg case law is 
regularly invoked by the Hungarian CC and human rights NGOs, and an 
increasing number of attorneys use frequently the ECtHR jurisprudence 
in litigation before domestic courts. Courts from time to time invoke the 
ECtHR judgments, but this is certainly not the rule. However, research 
indicates that also in the Western European democracies it took for 
judges two decades to regularly rely on judgments of the Strasbourg 
Court.59
Because structural deficiencies may not be corrected overnight we 
may expect a further increase in the number of applications. A further 
reason for this is that the CC, as compared to earlier times, has less 
opportunity to quash laws that fail to comply with the judgments of 
the ECtHR. First, the competence of the CC has been narrowed down. 
Second, laws found unconstitutional by the earlier judgments of the CC 
58 Rekvényi v. Hungary, No. 25390/94, 20 May 1999, ECHR 1999-III.
59 G. Kardos, ‘Az Emberi Jogok Európai Bírósága és Magyarország: Jogi kultúra 
és hatékonyság’ [The European Court of Human Rights and Hungary: Legal 
Culture and Efficiency], ‘Kriminlógiai Közelmények’ (Magyar Krtiminológiai 
Társaság, 2012), 207.
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have now been incorporated into the FL. Finally, laws running counter 
to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR (such as the provision in the Criminal 
Code on mandatory life imprisonment60 or the law criminalizing 
homelessness61) have been adopted exactly on the basis of the FL. 
These are just a few examples which will all likely contribute to an 
increase of the workload of the Strasbourg Court.
60 Act No. C of 2012. Article 90 (2)
61 Article 1 of Act No. CLIII of 2011 amending Act No. LXIX of 1999 on Petty 
Offenses.
